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As GPS World readers know, the growing prevalence of GPS/GNSS jamming and spoofing outside of conflict zones interrupts vital aviation safety technologies and presents challenges to maritime commerce and the global economy. An alarming example is playing out along the Baltic Sea and the North Sea, prompting 13 coastal European nations and Iceland to highlight in January 2026 “growing GNSS interference” and collectively reinforce requirements to comply with existing regulations and international law designed to ensure the safety of all maritime vessels engaged in shipping.
As commercial aircraft report navigation anomalies and maritime operators experience false position data in congested waterways, global authorities are sounding alarms that GNSS interference will continue to rise without immediate action. In March 2025, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), International Telecommunication Union (ITU), and International Maritime Organization (IMO) issued a joint warning expressing “grave concern” that disruptions from GNSS jamming and spoofing constitute an urgent threat to public safety, telecommunications networks and international commerce.
Compounding harmful interference incidents led the GPS Innovation Alliance (GPSIA) to act. Defeating illegal and harmful interference outside of combat zones requires a coordinated, whole-of-government strategy that focuses on stopping bad actors through deterrence and enforcement, and directing resources toward preventing and sanctioning those violating international commitments and laws prohibiting jamming and spoofing. Investing in GPS modernization and integrating innovative signals from complementary PNT satellite systems into devices and receivers will deliver PNT that surpasses today’s technologies to the global community.
Roadmap for Action
In September 2025, GPSIA led a coalition of leading industry groups in sending a letter to the Departments of Defense and Transportation that called for urgent action to address GPS jamming and spoofing. We noted the United States has the technology and expertise to solve this issue, and the administration has the power to act. GPSIA followed the letter with a whole-of-government strategy providing a clear roadmap for the administration. While some recommendations have been implemented, other opportunities remain.
Focus on the Real Culprits
The culprits in each of these scenarios are bad actors putting public safety and global commerce at risk with harmful interference outside conflict zones. The global community relies on several unique technologies that can be impacted by harmful interference, such as cellular and Wi-Fi signals, radars and automated information systems. The misplaced focus on faint GNSS signals or dependencies on GNSS derail collective efforts to immediately regain interference-free global commerce and bolster public safety.
Governments and international organizations mandate certain industries integrate safety-of-life technologies into their operations — and they do, at great cost. Officials should in turn be given the political support and resources to stop bad actors from
intentionally interfering with them.
What to Do Next
Public and continued diplomatic engagement are critical. By amplifying European counterparts, condemnations from senior U.S. officials can raise the reputational costs for bad actors and reaffirm international norms that protect GNSS signals and other technologies from harmful interference.
Engaging with the ICAO is important. The U.S. should reinforce its commitment to providing modern civil GPS signals that support navigation in international airspace and encourage ICAO to prioritize the enforcement of global GNSS protections.
GPSIA also recommends Executive agencies establish an interagency task force that rapidly identifies and disseminates information about interference events with civil operators, including sanitized intelligence information on intentional jamming and spoofing of commercial aircraft and ships.
Civil operators also should be invited to participate in interference coordination calls and reporting. Sharing radio-frequency interference data, incident reports and threat assessments among military and civil agencies and operators is essential to preserving public safety. The Performance-based Operations Aviation Rulemaking Committee’s recommendations for continuity of operations during GPS disruption events should continue to be implemented with urgency.
Deterrence and information sharing must be coupled with sustained enforcement. Federal agencies have taken welcome action to interdict illegal jamming equipment, reporting an 830% increase in seizures since 2021. We applaud the U.S. government for prioritizing resources to stop the illegal import and sale of these devices.
GPSIA commends the Kingdom of Norway’s annual Jammertest, which allows receiver and device manufacturers to test interference detection and counter jamming and spoofing. These realistic test scenarios, together with strengthened enforcement and prioritized intelligence collection and analysis, will enhance public safety.
Modernize GPS
While GPS satellites continue operating with an extraordinary 99.99% availability and no outages on record, the health of the constellation and jamming and spoofing incidents affecting receivers and devices, demand action. The final GPS III satellite is scheduled to launch this spring. Next-generation GPS IIIF satellites are being built. Their launches should be prioritized to reduce the number of satellites on orbit that are one system or subsystem away from failure. GPSIA welcomed the passage of the FY2026 Defense Appropriations Bill, which bolstered national and economic security by investing needed funding for modernized GPS IIIF satellites and long-term PNT leadership.
Notably, the current GPS program plan does not include counter-spoofing technologies. Implementing counter-spoofing authentication capabilities for Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) signals would further strengthen aviation resilience.
Ground infrastructure modernization is equally important. The GPS ground station must be able to command and monitor GPS III and IIIF satellites and the modern L5 aviation signal.
Streamline Regulatory Activities
Regulatory modernization represents another area of progress. In September 2025, the State Department removed jam-and spoof-resistant Controlled Reception Pattern Antennas (CRPAs) from the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), fulfilling one recommendation from GPSIA’s strategy.
Certification processes also must evolve, and integration of CRPAs into aircraft should be accelerated. The modern L5 signal and counter spoofing signal authentication signals must be incorporated into FAA-certified and other receivers as soon as possible.
Recommendations for the FCC
President Trump’s December 2025 Executive Order (EO), “Ensuring American Space Superiority,” directs U.S. departments and agencies to detect and counter threats to U.S. space infrastructure. It also states that his administration will enable industry to develop and deploy advanced space capabilities, including terrestrial and cislunar PNT applications. This EO should serve as a “North Star” for the FCC, resulting in increased enforcement resources to address illegal jamming and spoofing, and a regulatory environment prioritizing innovative, advanced commercial satellite PNT systems that complement GPS. Demonstrating American leadership in space demands that we step forward, not backwards, in our PNT capabilities.
The FCC is evaluating the record developed in its Notice of Inquiry, Promoting the Development of PNT Technologies and Solutions, and is reportedly considering future rulemaking. The FCC’s task is not to replace GPS, but to ensure that the regulatory environment protects its spectrum, increases enforcement actions against those perpetuating harmful interference and enables innovation that complements this foundational system. This balanced approach will fulfill President Trump’s mandate, preserving public safety and economic security, and ensure continued American leadership in PNT.
Global Safety and Commerce
The FCC’s Notice of Inquiry uncovered dozens of PNT technologies, ranging from those in the marketing stage, to hyper-localized solutions, to proposals to exploit “signals of opportunity.” Creativity and ingenuity abound in the commission’s record, but the docket’s many filings lacked technical details to evaluate whether the systems advance the nation’s
PNT leadership.
The hallmarks of GPS are its worldwide coverage, and the continuity, availability, integrity and accuracy of its signals. Our modern global community deserves complementary PNT systems and signals that meet or exceed GPS capabilities. A few satellite-based solutions stood out as holding promise to do so.
Systems operating in low-Earth orbit (LEO) can transmit stronger signal power due to their proximity to Earth, improving performance in urban environments and contested spectrum conditions. Systems operating in different frequency bands, such as TrustPoint’s C-band system, add spectral diversity, making it far more difficult for an adversary to disrupt all PNT services simultaneously. When combined with modernized GPS signals and authentication capabilities, this layered approach can deliver robust services while complementing the foundational role of GPS.
Terrestrial systems cannot replicate global coverage of satellite constellations. They are also vulnerable to wildfires, hurricanes and other disasters.Building parallel terrestrial networks would require significant investment while delivering a fraction of modernized satellite systems’ capabilities. Nor do terrestrial signals provide the continuity, availability, integrity and accuracy of satellite systems.
The Progress is Real
GPSIA is pleased to report that progress is being made in several areas outlined in its “whole-of-government” strategy. It’s time to accelerate that progress. In May 2026, GPSIA members will convene to evaluate this strategy and outline what more the PNT industry can do to play a part in defeating harmful interference. Our members also will meet with government officials to underpin that government-led enforcement and solutions to jamming and spoofing can further illustrate the importance of PNT to U.S. leadership in space, and national security, public safety and the global economy.
