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A Ukrainian defense system that spoofs GPS receivers into calculating their position to be in Lima, Peru’s capital, has defeated several Russian missile and UAV (drone) attacks on Kyiv, Ukraine’s capital, while also snarling traffic there, according to this article in The New York Times. It is not clear from the article, which refers only to GPS, whether other GNSS are equally affected, but other sources say that it also jams and spoofs GLONASS.
The Ukrainian system — which is appropriately called Lima — was made by a Ukrainian defense startup company called Cascade Systems, is operated by a territorial defense unit in the Kyiv region called Night Watch, and broadcasts from antennas near Kyiv. The article in The Times incorrectly calls its effect “jamming”, while describing what instead are clearly instance of spoofing. It also uses inaccurate popular expressions such as referring to a driver’s car navigation system as “his GPS” and pointing to “the GPS in phones and cars.”
Cascade Systems began developing the Lima system in 2022, initially targeting unmanned aerial vehicles such as Shahed‑136/Geran‑2 loitering munitions and guided aerial bombs. By 2024, Ukraine incorporated Lima into its broader electronic warfare network. “The latest version, Lima Quant, debuted in Kyiv in August 2025,” The Times reports, citing the unit’s commander as its source, “when Night Watch set up the powerful antennas around the capital to create a networked polygon-shaped dome of electromagnetic noise[.]”
According to The Times, “[s]ometimes, the [Russian] weapons are so confused to be in Peru that they make severe turns and break apart midair.” Lima’s biggest achievement, according to the article, came on May 24, when Russia fired toward the Kyiv region two units of its newest and most expensive missile, the supersonic Oreshnik, that it claims moves too fast for American-made Patriot interceptors to stop it. A Night Guard member successfully used the Lima Quant system to counter the missiles, after warnings from U.S. intelligence about an impending launch.
As The Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation points out in this post, the article in The Times reveals that many Russian weapons still rely on GNSS despite the availability of much stronger Chayka/eLoran signals, which are exceptionally hard to jam or spoof.
The article describes several instances of annoying and amusing effects on civilian traffic in Kyiv, such as car navigation systems placing the vehicle in Lima, Peru, 7,628 miles southwest of their location; a ride-sharing app telling a user that she would be dropped off at her Kyiv home in 12,276 minutes, after driving across South America, the Atlantic Ocean, and much of Europe; a Garmin GPS watch telling its user that he had run 6.22 kilometers in Lima in only 15 minutes 38 seconds; and a new BMW that suddenly stopped and demanded a mechanic’s attention claiming that it had driven more than 10,000 kilometers from Lima without an oil change.
