GNSS spoofing threatens airline safety, alarming pilots and aviation officials
The increasing prevalence of GNSS spoofing in commercial aviation poses significant safety concerns and highlights the need for robust alternative positioning, navigation and timing (A-PNT) sources. This form of electronic warfare, which uses fake signals to confuse aircraft navigation and safety systems, has become a growing issue for civilian flights worldwide.
Pilots told The Wall Street Journal that spoofing incidents have risen in recent months. According to analyses from SkAI Data Services and the Zurich University of Applied Sciences, the number of affected flights per day increased from a few dozen in February to more than 1,100 in August 2024.
The issue of spoofing has expanded beyond active conflict zones near Ukraine and the Middle East, and now affects hundreds of civilian pilots daily on a global scale. The modern cockpit’s heavy reliance on GPS technology means that falsified data can have far-reaching consequences, breaching multiple aircraft systems and causing disruptions that may last anywhere from a few minutes to an entire flight.
According to anonymized reports shared with government agencies and industry groups, pilots have experienced many alarming incidents, including sudden clock resets, false terrain warnings and unexpected flight path deviations. This surge in GNSS spoofing attacks highlights the vulnerability of critical navigation systems and raises significant concerns about aviation safety in an increasingly complex environment.
All jammed up
The Wall Street Journal reported that in August 2024, a United Airlines flight from New Delhi to the New York area encountered a GPS spoofing incident that affected its navigation systems for the duration of the flight.
Initially, the flight seemed to adhere to the standard GPS route across Asia, mirroring the path taken by previous flights heading to Newark Liberty International Airport. The spoofing attack, originating in the Black Sea region south of Ukraine, caused the aircraft’s GPS coordinates to deviate progressively from its actual position throughout the remainder of the flight.
Even after the plane had left the affected area, its reported GPS location continued to show erratic behavior, occasionally making sudden jumps. This suggested that the navigation equipment was struggling to recalibrate accurately. While alternative navigation systems ensured the flight’s safe completion of its intended route, the compromised GPS data indicated that it had terminated in the Atlantic Ocean. In reality, the aircraft landed safely at its scheduled destination in Newark.
Keeping operations safe
Aviation safety officials said spoofing has disrupted some flights but has not posed major safety risks. Pilots are trained to use A-PNT systems as backups. However, managing false GNSS signals and alerts risks dividing the operator’s attention if a more severe problem arises.
“If we lose an airplane because of workload issues because of these problems we’re encountering, compounded with an emergency, that is going to be a horrendous event,” said Ken Alexander, the Federal Aviation Administration’s chief scientist for satellite navigation, during a pilot union forum in Washington, D.C.
Airlines are collaborating with aircraft manufacturers, parts suppliers, and aviation safety authorities to devise immediate solutions and long-term strategies. For example, the International Air Transport Association (IATA) and the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) are openly discussing these challenges and holding workshops to share best practices. Safety bulletins have also been issued for operations where spoofing and jamming are known to have occurred.
Industry insiders told The Wall Street Journal that the development of new equipment standards to enhance civilian aircraft resilience against spoofing attacks is not expected to be finalized until 2025.
Navigating issues across sectors
According to anonymized reports collected by OpsGroup, an aviation safety organization that includes pilots, dispatchers and other airline staff, various attacks have caused navigation issues across multiple sectors.
GNSS spoofing has disrupted operations in Europe but has not endangered flights, said Florian Guillermet, executive director of the European Union Aviation Safety Agency. Pilots had to divert to airports they did not intend to land at, and earlier this year, an airline temporarily halted operations at an Estonian airport that was not equipped with ground-based navigation as a backup for GNSS.
Boeing said manufacturers, carriers and regulators globally are contributing GPS expertise for solutions to ensure safety. Boeing and Airbus are working with airlines to help develop procedures to assist pilots, the companies said.
United and American said their pilots are equipped with several ways to navigate with precision, even with GPS interference. American said it has not experienced disruptions or significant safety concerns from GPS interference.
Insights from industry experts
During the 64th Civil GPS Service Interface Committee Meeting — hosted at ION GNSS+ 2024 from Sept. 16-17 — The presentation “Complementing GNSS for Resilient Performance Based Navigation” by Okuary Osechas Ph.D., and Gary A. McGraw, Ph.D., addressed the critical role of complementary positioning, navigation and timing (CPNT) technologies in aviation, particularly in light of increasing threats to GNSS.
The presentation highlights the impact of radio frequency interference (RFI) on aviation, including jamming and spoofing. These pose significant risks to aviation safety by reducing operational margins. The prevalence of these threats is increasing, necessitating alternative navigation solutions.
Performance-based navigation (PBN) is essential for modern aviation, enhancing efficiency and flexibility. However, it relies heavily on GNSS, making it vulnerable to disruptions, again highlighting the need for CPNT services.
Integrating CPNT sources ensures resilient navigation capabilities. This includes leveraging legacy navigation aids and modernized terrestrial systems. Various complementary technologies such as eDME, eLORAN, LDACS-NAV and LEO SATNAV are being assessed for their operational effectiveness, compatibility and potential to support aviation needs.
The researchers recommend the following to address these challenges:
Near-term solutions: Implementing eDME for backward compatibility.
Medium-term strategies: Utilizing eLORAN for wide-area time distribution.
Long-term goals: Developing LDACS-NAV to enhance spectrum efficiency and standardization.
Collaborative efforts: The presentation calls for international cooperation in research and development to advance standards and infrastructure investments in complementary PNT technologies.
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