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Russian acts targeting critical infrastructure, satellite signal interference paralyzing maritime and air navigation, and cognitive operations aimed at intimidating European societies are examples of Russian hybrid activities targeting the Baltic Sea region states.
The paper, “White Paper on Russian Acts of Sabotage and Subversion against Members of the Council of the Baltic Sea States,” can be downloaded here. Authors Filip Bryjka, Anna Maria Dyner and Aleksandra Kozioł are with the Polish Institute of International Relations.
The report explores GNSS signal disruptions in the Baltic Sea and how it affects the safety of maritime and air traffic.
Scale and Methods of Russian Operations
Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia has intensified its hybrid activities against NATO member states, particularly those that have most actively supported Ukrainian resistance. This group includes the members of the Council of the Baltic Sea States. It is against them that the vast majority of acts of diversion and sabotage recorded in Europe since February 2022 have been directed.
Russia deploys a full spectrum of tools against the region:
- Acts of diversion and sabotage targeting critical infrastructure.
- Border incidents: Violations of airspace and maritime borders.
- GNSS signal disruptions (satellite radio transmissions), creating operational problems for maritime and air navigation.
- Cognitive influence, aimed at causing measurable damage, testing state responses, and inducing a sense of growing threat among societies.
Recommendations: How to Counter Hybrid Threats?
The offensive nature of Russian actions demonstrates an intent to destabilize NATO and EU countries. Effective defense requires developing shared mechanisms:
- Close cooperation among agencies: Ensuring a high level of situational awareness through the coordination of activities (at both national and international levels) among military and civilian intelligence, counterintelligence, border guard services, and the police.
- A dedicated information exchange system: Leveraging the geographical proximity and potential of the CBSS states to quickly share threat data.
- Unambiguous attribution of persuasions: Publicly naming Russia as the author of the attacks. A lack of clear attribution hinders coordinated preventive and retaliatory measures.
- A catalog of best practices: Developing common rules for monitoring, reporting, and responding to known and repetitive Russian operational patterns.
The authors conclude that only a full spectrum of coherent measures taken by all states in the region, alongside NATO and EU structures, can effectively influence Russia and reduce the risk of future incidents.
