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Marine

Availability and Safety

September 1, 2011 By: Alan Grant, Paul Williams, George Shaw, Michelle De Voy, Nick Ward GPS World


Many maritime users today believe that GPS will always be available. This is simply not the case.
 


Two positions reported from the demonstration vessel during Newcastle trials. The green dot shows the true location of the vessel, given by eLoran, within the jamming area (red hatched box). The blue vessel icon is the erroneously reported GPS position. The line emerging from the icon indicates the speed, reported erroneously as more than 700 knots.

 

GNSS availability can be affected in many ways, through events or conditions that affect constellation health, the signal-in-space, or the reception of that signal. The primary means of positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) employed in maritime applications, whether stand-alone or augmented, has well known vulnerabilities.

This article considers three specific threats and reports on how they may affect maritime safety: GNSS interference and jamming; constellation availability; and space weather events.

Interference and Jamming

There has been a marked increase in both the use and the availability of GPS jamming equipment in recent years. The implications are that jamming units may find their way onto ferries and around ports or harbors where they will interfere with the many systems utilizing GPS, thus affecting maritime safety.

GPS jamming units are widely available on the Internet, with current models already capable of jamming L1, L2, and L5 signals. While we report here on the jamming of GPS, all GNSS constellations would be affected in a similar manner.

To understand the effects of jamming and GPS service denial on maritime safety, the General Lighthouse Authorities of the United Kingdom and Ireland (GLAs) conducted two jamming trials, in collaboration with the UK Government’s Ministry of Defence (MOD), who provided and operated the GPS jamming units. For the safety of all GPS users, and in line with MOD regulations for the peacetime use of GPS jamming units, notice was given to all national bodies. In addition, the GLAs issued notices to mariners explaining that aids to navigation (AtoNs) using GPS in the vicinity of the trials location would be unreliable during the jamming periods.

Flamborough Head. The first jamming trial was conducted off the East coast of the United Kingdom near Flamborough Head. The aim of this trial was to understand the effect GPS jamming may have on ship-borne and shore-based equipment, GLA AtoNs, and also on the crew.

The Northern Lighthouse Board vessel Pole Star steamed between two known waypoints, through an area affected by the jamming signal. Data was recorded from two typical marine-grade GPS receivers installed on the vessel, along with an eLoran receiver that provided the true position throughout the trial.

The results identified three distinct states (Table 1) corresponding to the manner in which GPS-fed equipment responded to jamming conditions. When the jamming signal was sufficiently strong to prevent reception of GPS signals, a large number of alarms sounded on the bridge almost simultaneously, providing a potentially disconcerting and confusing environment for the mariner. However, the effect that represented the highest risk was the provision of erroneous data from some GPS receivers.


Table 1. Effects observed for the three states identified from Flamborough Head trials.

 

Figure 1 compares an erroneous position reported by a typical marine-grade GPS receiver with the vessel’s true location. In this figure, the light blue line shows the path taken between the two waypoints.

The colors of the plotted position points indicate vessel speed. The three states described in Table 1 can be seen.

State 1 is observed at either end of the passage where the solid blue line occurs; this is where the jamming signal strength is much lower than the GPS signal strength, and the GPS-fed systems are operating normally.


Figure 1. Reported positions from one of the typical marine-grade receivers installed on the vessel. An erroneous GPS position (red circle) is compared to the corresponding eLoran position (green square). The GPS position is reported as being inland 22 km west from the true eLoran position. (Red lines indicate the boundaries of the main lobe of the jamming unit and position colors indicate reported speed: blue <15 knots, yellow <50 knots, orange <100 knots, and red >100 knots).
 

As the vessel approached the main lobe of the jamming signal, indicated by the red lines, it reached an area where the jamming signal was comparable with the received GPS signals, leading to State 2. During this state, erroneous data can be observed with the receiver reporting the vessel on land traveling at high speed.

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About the Author: Alan Grant


About the Author: Paul Williams


About the Author: George Shaw


About the Author: Michelle De Voy


About the Author: Nick Ward


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