IIF and the Woolly Mammoth
June 9, 2010 By: Don JewellDefense PNT Newsletter, June 2010
There are any number of topics I could and probably should have written about this month, but no matter where I look there is this Woolly Mammoth in the room that has been and continues to be impossible to ignore. Most writers would equate the virtual presence to an elephant, but this particular saga has been prevalent for so long it seems like it has been with us since the early Pliocene Epoch.
IIF History
In April 1996 (more than 14 years ago, but who’s counting) Boeing was selected by the U.S. Air Force to design, develop and produce the next-generation of GPS satellites, the GPS IIF. The original USAF production and launch schedule that was briefed at the time showed ramp-up to full production in the year 2000, when the first launch should have occurred. It also showed production levels of approximately 1.3 satellites per year, with the last satellite being built and launched in 2009 — or, there was the option to build all the satellites quickly and place them in ground storage until they were needed.However, a satellite that has been sitting in ground storage for 10 years is going to be very suspect and require considerable testing to ensure viability.
The real fly in the ointment was the subsequent announcement that the U.S. government had authorized the development of the GPS IIF modernization program, which included the upgrade of six GPS IIF satellites and an additional buy of six modernized IIF satellites. As the old saying goes, things went downhill from that point onward due in part to the spectacular failure of a U.S. government program known as TSPR, or Total Integration System Performance Responsibility, and the inability of the U.S. government to make up its collective mind about the future requirements for GPS. (Editor's Note: For more on TSPR see Don Jewell’s GPS World article on the GAO Report on GPS from June 9, 2009.)
Regardless of who is at fault, the result was a severely mismanaged and at times apparently hapless program. This came as a surprise to many in the government as well as in industry, because at that point in its history Boeing, for nearly three decades, had actually played a key role in what has become a vital and ubiquitous worldwide utility. Boeing designed and developed 40 first- and second-generation NAVSTAR GPS satellites and provided launch and on-orbit support from Shriever Air Force Base in Colorado. But as the old adage in the stock market goes, “Past performance is no guarantee of future results.”
Hopefully that very undistinguished period in the GPS program and in Boeing’s history is behind us, and Boeing with its dozen IIF satellites will go on to bigger and better performance. Of course, that is yet to be seen. The first satellite in the new GPS family, IIF-1, has only been on orbit for about nine days as I write this, and all indications are that it will not be set healthy for another 81 days, and that is if all goes according to plan. And when was the last time that happened with the IIF program?
However, I must give Boeing and Colonel Dave Madden credit. Boeing because they hung in there and have finally, hopefully, brought the program to fruition, and Colonel Madden because he never gave up hope even during some of the darkest days in his last three years as the commander of the GPS Wing. When others would express grave doubts about the IIF program and wax eloquently and vociferously about the excessive $1.6 billion program cost (not including the extra $800 million for the ground segment) and the incredibly long gestation period, Dave would merely smile and say, “Just wait and see, we are going to pull this off before I retire.” And to think Boeing and the GPS Wing accomplished the feat with just 21 days to spare before said retirement. Talk about cutting it close, especially considering that it took five launch attempts to get the first IIF payload launched; this was indeed a launch that everyone was happy to see finally happen, and to Dave’s credit, he delivered on his promise.
The Launch
Speaking of the launch, that was spectacular in its own right and a first as well. The IIF launch was the first time a Delta IV launch vehicle — officially designated Delta 349, a Delta IV Medium + (4,2) vehicle, which is also designated as an EELV or Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle — carried a GPS satellite into orbit, and it accomplished the mission in record time and in style. There was no transfer orbit for the first IIF payload, in other words, no waiting, as it was a direct injection launch that carried the IIF to its orbit location just 3 hours and 33 minutes after launch — very impressive.
The Delta IV has only been around since 2002, but is quickly becoming the workhorse launch vehicle for ULA or the United Launch Alliance, which is a consortium between Lockheed Martin and Boeing, among others, to provide launch vehicles primarily for the U.S. government. There have been 13 launches since the beginning of the program. Each launch has delivered the payload to orbit. In one case a Delta Heavy did not quite get the payload to the correct orbit, but the launch was still a success in my book. Quite an impressive record and we hope to be able to see the Delta IV in action again later this year with the launch of the second IIF GPS payload (IIF-2), which some predict could come as early as September. Many of you who keep track of these things may remember that the IIF-2 payload made the round trip to the Cape once before. This time let’s hope it results in a launch.
Success?
So God’s in His Heaven, the first IIF is finally on orbit and transmitting. All is right with the world. Right? Evidently not, at least many of you don’t think so. Oops! a dangling participle. Apropos dangling participles, Winston Churchill, that great British statesman, writer, and orator, who was known for being very quick on his feet, once replied to a criticism that he used too many dangling participles with the famous quote, “That is something up with which I will not put.” But I digress.
Certainly we all breathed a sigh of relief when we were informed the IIF-1 payload was successfully transmitting signals, but my mail bag is full of letters from readers asking why many of the PNT signals and capabilities on GPS satellites currently in orbit are not now and will not be in the near future used for PNT (position, navigation, and timing) purposes?
The answer, unfortunately, as far as I can determine, is antiquated thinking, outdated U.S. government policies concerning GPS signals on orbit, an outdated Kalman filtering process, and reluctance by the U.S. military to trust other agencies inside and outside the U.S. government to monitor the GPS signals. Which boils down to a lack of serious cogent thought and trust.
Indeed, the problem is not just with the IIF satellite. There are IIR, IIRM, and IIRM+ satellites on orbit today that may well reach their mean mission duration. One IIR has already, without ever broadcasting all the signals or using all the PNT capabilities that reside onboard the satellite. Consider that the IIF satellite has the capability to broadcast the following seven signals:
- L1/CA* - active signal used for PNT
- L1/PY* - active signal used for PNT, encrypted component
- L2* - active signal used for PNT
- L2C - on orbit, not currently used for PNT purposes
- L3 - on orbit, not currently used for PNT purposes
- L5 - on orbit, not currently used for PNT purposes
- M-Code - on orbit, not currently used for PNT purposes
Only three of the signals listed will be used for PNT purposes in the near future unless policies change and those changes are very much overdue. There are those of us that would like to see a new GPS signal actively broadcast for PNT purposes when it first reaches orbit. Why wait for eight payloads with that signal or for as many as 24? Sometimes I think the decision makers forget there is a war going on and young men and women are putting their lives in harm's way.
We have the capability to provide our warfighters with at least three additional and unique PNT signals from orbit. In the case of L2C, L5, and M-Code, the signals currently reside on satellites already in orbit and can be broadcast at greater signal strength than L1. These extra signals provide greater signal strength, diversity, and availability to reduce jamming and interference, not to mention fratricide. So why aren’t these signals being broadcast to our warfighters?
The reasoning seems to center around antiquated government policies and the lack of ground monitoring stations. However, it is common knowledge that several very competent government agencies monitor all GPS frequencies and orbits and duly report the signal and ephemeris data to those that need to know. There are numerous universities and research organizations around the globe that monitor GPS as well, and publish the resulting data on the web. So it is not a lack of signal monitoring per se, but evidently a lack of credible signal monitoring by trusted agents. Now, of course, why the U.S. government can build satellites and payloads to broadcast the signals from space, but can’t build credible Earth monitoring stations in the numbers necessary to feed a reliable Kalman filter is another question, and one that I will be asking the folks responsible in the near future. Let me know what you think about this issue. Stay tuned for that and more, and until next time, happy navigating.
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Comments
on: June 10, 2010 - 1:37pm
Excellent article!
Nice that you mention TSPR in the context of your article, as TSPR had an effect on GPS testing for this time period (effects still felt). The "TSPR" concept put the contractor soley responsible for developmental testing with the government only having "Insight" (loss of "Oversight").
Here's a ITEA paper that goes into the details (with excerpt below)
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dte/docs/2010Mar_Adolph_DoD_Acquisition_Test_Process_(U).pdf
"The OSD office responsible for developmental test and evaluation was dismantled in 1999. Since that time, there has been no effective OSD oversight of developmental test and evaluation programs, practices or workforce training."
Also, Aviation Week (Apr 2010) article on Darleen Druyun
"In addition, by using best commercial practices and performance-based specifications, they reduced the cycle time for the next block of GPS satellites from 7 to 5 years, saved costs of morethan $1B across the acquisition, and reduced SPO manpower on this effort by 38 percent."